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On Friday October 16, 1981, President Ronald Reagan wrote in his personal
diary, “Central America is really the world’s next hotspot. Nicaragua is an armed camp
supplied by Cuba and threatening a communist takeover of all of Central America.” 1 For
the next eight years as Commander-in-Chief, this mindset would shape his perspective on
the small Third World country about the size of North Carolina. The Administration’s
policies, actions, and attitudes toward Nicaragua and other perceived hostile nations
became known as “Reagan Doctrine.” The defeat of the Nicaraguan Revolution became
the “cornerstone of the Reagan Central American policy and the test case of Reagan
Doctrine.” 2 This paper offers an analysis and critique of the effectiveness of Reagan
Doctrine in Nicaragua.
Reagan Doctrine was not a label coined by President Reagan or his
administration. It was a term used later by his critics to define his foreign policy strategy
for countries around the world. The Reagan Doctrine was a strategy to aid anticommunist, or more specifically, anti-Soviet insurgencies in the Third World during
Reagan’s two terms as president from 1981-1989. The primary goal was to overthrow
Marxist regimes and/or prevent Marxist regimes from becoming established.
Reagan wasted no time getting started in the implementation of his foreign policy.
He supported insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua soon after
his election in 1981. 3 The Administration’s first comprehensive “U.S. National Security
Strategy,” which was a document approved by the President in May of 1982, stated the
1

Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2007),

44.
2

William I. Robinson, A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and
American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Co: Westview Press Inc., 1992), 12.
3
Though the topic of this paper is the case study of Nicaragua under Reagan Doctrine, it is
important to note that while facilitating insurrections in Nicaragua, the administration was doing the same
thing in other Third World countries. Reagan Doctrine was a global strategy. The support of the
Mujaheddin in their war against USSR in Afghanistan is another example of the Reagan Doctrine.
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objective to “contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control and military presence
throughout the world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy,
terrorist and subversive forces.” 4 Reagan made staunch calls for public support in his
efforts. In the State of the Union Address in 1985, for example, he stated that the U.S.
must “not break faith with those who are risking their lives—on every continent, from
Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet-supported aggression.” One year later he
boldly remarked that “America will support with moral and material assistance your right
not just to fight and die for freedom, but to fight and win freedom…in Afghanistan, in
Angola, in Cambodia, and in Nicaragua.” 5
In most of these nations, the aggressive policies and actions of Reagan caused
severe damage. In Nicaragua for example, the economy was decimated by U.S. sanctions
and manipulation of its banking institutions. The Administration, supported by Congress,
funded a war against the Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de
Liberación Nacional, or FSLN). It was a war fought by various Nicaraguan rebel groups,
labeled the Contras, which sought to overthrow the Sandinistas, who came to power after
the revolution in 1979.
The development of Contra forces began in 1981 when Reagan authorized $19.5
million in funding for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to construct a paramilitary
force of 500 Nicaraguan exiles from deposed President Anastasio Somoza’s National
Guard. 6 Along with congressionally funded aid, members of the Reagan Administration
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Chester Pach, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle, Pragmatism, and Policy,” Presidential Studies
Quarterly 36.1 (2006): 80.
5
James M. Scott, “Interbranch Rivalry and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua,” Political Science
Quarterly 112, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 237.
6
Kenneth Roberts, “Bullying and Bargaining: The United States, Nicaragua, and Conflict
Resolution in Central America,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Autumn 1990): 78.
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attained additional funds through the illicit sales of arms to Iran. Funds from these sales
were funneled to the Contras. When this illegal activity was revealed in the “Iran-Contra
Affair” in November of 1986, it led to the indictment and conviction of many of
Reagan’s staff.
The results of continual U.S. aggression in the 1980s were major factors that led
to the ultimate fall of the FSLN. The Sandinista collapse was not due to a Contra military
victory, however, but was essentially due to the economic impact of U.S. sanctions, the
trade embargo, and Contra attacks on the social and economic infrastructure of the
country. The failing economy was the determining factor that finally pushed President
Daniel Ortega to accept his defeat in the elections of 1990 and turn over the government
to the victorious conservative, Violeta Chamorro. These elections were not due to
Reagan’s efforts however, but rather to others, particularly President Oscar Arias of
Costa Rica. It was he who facilitated and negotiated the peaceful transfer of power in
Nicaragua. 7 Reagan’s aggressive foreign policy did not lead to the ceasefire in 1988 nor
the democratic elections and peace agreements of 1989-90.
Reagan policy in Nicaragua was failure in many respects. The Contra war was illconceived and did not enjoy support of the people of Nicaragua. The rebel forces never
legitimately threatened the Sandinista government and military. The U.S. failed to gain
international support for the war or its political and economic actions. In fact, Reagan

7

Sources that evaluate and discuss Arias’ peace plan and how it was developed and eventually
adopted are well-documented in: Kenneth Roberts, “Bullying and Bargaining: The United States,
Nicaragua, and Conflict Resolution in Central America,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Autumn 1990):
67-102 and Linda Robinson, “Peace in Central America?,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (January 1988).
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was largely condemned by the international community. Domestic support and popular
opinion was low as well. 8
Reagan complained in his diary in March of 1985 of the lack of support, writing:
“Our communications on Nicaragua have been a failure, 90 percent of the people know
it’s a communist country but almost as many don’t want us to give the Contras [money]
for weapons.” 9 U.S. funding and support for the war effort was inadequate. The
blemishes of the Iran-Contra Affair and the failure of the Contra mission to overthrow the
government scarred Reagan’s remaining years as President. As the war continued on,
Reagan lost more and more support in Congress for his efforts in Nicaragua, and it
eventually led to his decreased role in bringing peace to the country, especially after the
Republican Party loss of a Senate majority in 1986. 10
Nicaragua did not pose a threat to the U.S., and the Soviet Union and Cuba did
not try to dominate Ortega and his government, even though they provided aid to the
Sandinistas as a result of the U.S. economic embargo. Reagan was convinced that
Nicaragua was “of course” another Cuba. 11 Reagan’s policies pushed communist nations
into aiding Nicaragua. The FSLN enjoyed majority support of the people, and were not
looking for a change until the end of the decade when they could no longer survive with
the Sandinistas under U.S. pressure. Did Reagan really need to be concerned with
Nicaragua? Probably not. However, his firm Cold War policy stance led him to believe

8

Joshua Muravchik, “The Nicaragua Debate,” Foreign Affairs 65, no. 2 (December 1986): 371.
For example, in 1986, a CBS/New York Times poll revealed that there was more than a 2-1
majority that U.S. citizens opposed funding the Contras.
9
Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 308, 402.
10
Roberts, 94.
11
Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 67.
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that the country posed a threat, and he had to do whatever it took to keep socialism out of
Central America by making Nicaragua “say uncle.” 12
In damaging Nicaragua’s economy, Reagan Doctrine policy caused ripple effects
on the USSR and Cuba who were aiding Nicaragua during this time. When the
Administration began to halt trade and relations with Nicaragua, the USSR and Cuba
began their efforts to provide the country increased economic aid, military aid, and trade
revenue. By the time Reagan left office, economic aid from the USSR never came close
to covering Nicaragua’s losses from U.S. sanctions on the economy. The USSR was not
prepared to shoulder the financial burden of propping the Nicaraguan economy. 13 When
the Sandinistas lost the elections of 1990, the USSR cut off its aid to Nicaragua. In 1991
the USSR collapsed largely due to its own failing economy. Was it Reagan’s goal to
financially strap the USSR through pressure on Nicaragua and other similar Soviet allies?
It is likely, and if it was his goal, it worked.
Many historians, political scientists, and economists have analyzed the
complicated issue of Reagan Doctrine and its stress on Nicaragua that lasted almost a
decade. It has been nearly twenty years since the Sandinistas were ousted from power,
and evaluation of what led to their demise has been the subject of research and debate. 14
Many scholars have come to the similar conclusion that the Reagan Administration
mishandled Nicaragua in most respects, especially militarily and diplomatically.
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Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More
Than Remaking Governments,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 66.
13
William M. Leogrande, “Making the Economy Scream: US Economic Sanctions against
Sandinista Nicaragua,” Third World Quarterly 17, no. 2 (1996): 342-43.
14
However former President, Daniel Ortega, was re-elected as President in 2006, representing the
FSLN once more.
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The historiographal approach to the topic has been predominantly quantative,
especially when historians discuss the economic impact the U.S. had on Nicaragua. The
statistical and numerical data they provide is extensive. Much of the data comes from the
government of Nicaragua: the Secretariat of Planning and the Budget and the Fondo
Internacional de Reconstruccion, Managua. The statistics provided show numerical data
representing such things as the impact of the damage of the balance of payments, the
effect of the production losses on exports and domestic supply, and fiscal debt and
inflation. 15
William M. Leogrande’s journal article “Making the Economy Scream: US
Economic Sanctions Against Sandinista Nicaragua”, published in 1996, looks at the
economic stranglehold the U.S. placed on the Sandinista government in Nicaragua from
1981-1990. Leogrande is an expert on Latin American affairs, and has frequently
published works on the relationships between the U.S. and Latin American countries.
Unlike analyses published by political scientists and historians during the 1980s, or
shortly after the FSLN fell, this work discusses what happened almost a decade after the
Sandinista government disintegrated. 16 It provides a clearer picture of what happened
after all the “dust had settled.” The key players of the era were either dead or gone, the
FSLN had been defeated in elections and replaced, and the impact of the economic
sanctions can be analyzed. Leogrande’s thesis is Reagan decimated the Nicaraguan

15

E. V. K. Fitzgerald, An Evaluation of Economic Costs to Nicaragua of U.S. Aggression: 19801984, in The Political Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua, ed. Rose J. Spalding (Winchester,
Massachusetts: Allen & Unwin, Inc., 1987), 200-02.
16
Great sources of evaluating the economic impact of U.S.-led sanctions during the first term of
Reagan’s Administration: William I. Robinson, A Faustian Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan
Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era (Boulder, Co: Westview Press Inc.,
1992) and Bradford E. Burns, At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia
(New York: Harper & Row, 1987) 29-35.
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economy and sanctions and the trade embargo were the most effective tools the
administration used to destabilize the Nicaraguan government.
This article is useful to compare with E.V.K. Fitzgerald’s chapter in The Political
Economy of Revolutionary Nicaragua. 17 Both Fitzgerald and Leogrande examine the
economic effects resulting from the relationship between the two nations. Each historian
views the issues during different time periods. “What if” statistics, which are projected
outcomes of continual anticipated U.S. sanctions, portrayed by Fitzgerald, can be
examined and analyzed to a degree in Leogrande’s work. Like Fitzgerald, Leogrande also
uses a quantative approach by using numbers, statistics, and studies to make his
arguments against the U.S. For example, Fitzgerald displays a table within the text that
projects that annual growth in Nicaragua will continue to suffer and decline under U.S.
sanctions through the rest of the 1980s. 18 Her concerns in 1984 about Nicaragua’s future
under U.S. sanctions are confirmed by Leogrande’s contemporary work that reflects on
the rest of the decade. Leogrande states that by 1988, Nicaragua was in a severe
recession, the economy contracted by 15 percent, and inflation was steadily increasing. 19
From separate eras, Leogrande and Fitzgerald similarly argue that economic
sanctions by the Reagan Administration were essential in bringing down the Sandinistas.
Reagan’s actions during his presidency were viewed negatively by his contemporaries,
and the analysis of his actions post-1990 reflects those early felt sentiments. They
conclude that economic action taken by the U.S. ultimately led to the fall of the
Sandinistas. It can then be argued, like many historians do, that Reagan’s military actions
against the Sandinistas ultimately were unsuccessful in his hope to break the socialist
17

Fitzgerald, 195-213.
Ibid., 211.
19
Leogrande, 343.
18
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government while his economic policies severely damaged the country. While Reagan
essentially succeeded in bringing down the Sandinistas and draining Soviet and Cuban
resources, his military campaign failed to bring the Sandinistas down, and the collateral
damage caused by the Contras was significant.
The Contra war was intended to be fought against the military and military
installations of the FSLN. Congress approved funding on several occasions throughout
Reagan’s two terms because Reagan assured legislators in Washington that the Contras
would be fighting the military exclusively. 20 Congress was hesitant to support the
insurgency, but voted for funding anyway. Reagan was emphatic that the U.S. would not
be supplying its own troops, hoping to alleviate fears of “another Vietnam.” 21 However,
the Contras instead resorted to attacking the people of Nicaragua. Testimony of U.S.
special forces confirm the focus of attacks was primarily economic targets, such as oil
fields, coffee fields, and even the planting of mines in port cities.
The U.S. played a significant role in these sabotage campaigns, but tried to paint
the picture that it was entirely the Contra’s doing, keeping connections with the U.S. out
of the conversation as much as possible. 22 E. Bradford Burns, for example, concurs with
the notion of the role of the U.S., making it a primary argument in his book.23 The
analysis of the Contra war is very condemning of the Reagan Administration. In fact, it is
20

Useful sources on developing and implementation of U.S. foreign policy towards Nicaragua, as
well as the actions of the Executive and Legislative branches include: William I. Robinson, A Faustian
Bargain: U.S. Intervention in the Nicaraguan Elections and American Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War
Era (Boulder, Co: Westview Press Inc., 1992), Chester Pach, “The Reagan Doctrine: Principle,
Pragmatism, and Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36.1 (2006), James M. Scott, “Interbranch Rivalry
and the Reagan Doctrine in Nicaragua,” Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 2 (Summer 1997) and Philip
Brenner, and William M. Leogrande, “The House Divided: Ideological Polarization over Aid to the
Nicaraguan ‘Contras’,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 18, no. 1 (February 1993).
21
Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 308.
22
Leogrande, 340.
23
Bradford E. Burns, At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia
(New York: Harper & Row, 1987).
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even suggested that many actions that the CIA and the Contras were engaging in could be
defined as acts of terrorism. 24 Historians agree that the Contras were militarily weak and
posed limited threat to the government and Sandinista military. The Contras were
successful however, in launching a campaign against domestic targets that helped to
bankrupt the national economy.
Scholars concur that Reagan’s war to bring down the FSLN was both illegal and
ineffective. The Contras were unsuccessful and were not fighting a war that had been
outlined by the Administration and Congress. Historians focusing on the relationship
between the U.S. and Nicaragua during the 1980s offer different perspectives on what
occurred, who was responsible, and what the final results were. Some scholars focus on
the lack of military success, others on foreign policy formulation and implementation,
and others evaluate the conflict through the problems the Administration faced by failing
to get significant international support.25
There are several reasons why Reagan Doctrine policy in Nicaragua was
unsuccessful and why U.S. intervention in the country was needless. When evidence is
analyzed it becomes quite clear that the Reagan Administration acted harshly with the
small, underdeveloped, weak Third World country during his two terms as President. 26

24

Burns, 152.
Sources to analyze the lack of international support include: Bradford E. Burns, At War in
Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia (New York: Harper & Row, 1987) and
Kenneth Roberts, “Bullying and Bargaining: The United States, Nicaragua, and Conflict Resolution in
Central America,” International Security 15, no. 2 (Autumn 1990). Valuable sources for evaluating the
lack of Contra success against the Sandinista military: Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control: The Story of the
Reagan Administration’s Secret War in Nicaragua (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), Bruce
W. Jentleson, “The Reagan Administration and Coercive Diplomacy: Restraining More Than Remaking
Governments,” Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 1 (Spring 1991).
26
Transcripts of speeches, essays, letters, and radio addresses are found in: Ronald Reagan,
Reagan in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal His Revolutionary Vision For
America, ed. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson (New York: Simon & Schuster,
Inc., 2001) and diary entry primary sources are found in: Ronald Reagan, The Reagan Diaries, ed. Douglas
Brinkley (New York: HarperCollins, 2007).
25
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Nicaragua was not a threat to the national security of the U.S. The Sandinistas were not
working with the USSR and Cuba to undermine the U.S. Reagan acted with a heavy
hand, and the people of Nicaragua suffered tremendously because of his foreign policy.
The Sandinistas improved the lives of the people as compared to Somoza’s reign, they
held legitimate elections, and were willing to make concessions to the U.S. if Reagan was
willing to negotiate. Reagan’s military campaign against the Sandinista forces was
unsuccessful, and the revelations of CIA actions in Nicaragua and the Iran-Contra Affair
all but eliminated international and domestic support for his foreign policy in Central
America.
Reagan worried that the Nicaraguan Revolution would start a “domino effect” in
Latin American countries. He feared countries would eventually fall to communism. 27
The USSR and Cuba would infiltrate and utilize these countries to expand their influence
over the globe and inch closer to the American border and establish a “beachhead.” 28 He
believed the Sandinistas were oppressive to their people and that the citizens desired
democracy.
Quite the opposite of being oppressive, the Sandinista revolution improved the lives
of the people in several areas. After 1979, Nicaraguans enjoyed greater access to
education, health care, and land. In 1980, a crash literacy campaign reduced illiteracy
from 50 to 10 percent. By 1983, more than a million Nicaraguans (40 percent of the
population) were in school and the number of schools doubled between 1979 and 1984.
The government provided free education from kindergarten through graduate school.

27

The U.S., at this same time, was also heavily involved with the El Salvadoran and Guatemalan
military. Insurgencies in both countries received some support from socialist nations. This further
supported Reagan’s belief that the USSR and Cuba was trying to gain a foothold in Central America.
28
Jentleson, 66.
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Health care was also free. Agrarian reform targeted unused and underused land by
handing it over to people who wanted it and were willing to work on it. 29 These were all
changes provided after the Somoza Dynasty was overthrown in 1979. 30
Nicaragua had no intentions of becoming a client state of the USSR. Leaders of the
FSLN actually downplayed the role of Marxism in the formulation of their party, and
instead focused almost exclusively on the figure of Sandino (the founder of the FSLN
decades before) and other Nicaraguan heroes who had been symbols of resistance to U.S.
domination. 31 Though Nicaragua relied heavily on Soviet and Cuban aid through the
1980s, it strove tremendously to erase the label as a Soviet client state in a desperate bid
to gain support from West European governments as well as liberals in U.S. Congress. 32
Trying to erase the label that they were not a Soviet client state, early on the
Sandinistas showed willingness to compromise with the U.S. Following the U.S.
invasion of Grenada in October 1983, Nicaraguan representatives made independent
conciliatory moves to ease the pressure on their nation. Salvadoran rebel leaders and one
thousand Cuban military advisors were asked to leave the country. Furthermore, the
government offered to negotiate additional restrictions on foreign advisors, military
forces and arms imports. The Contra rebels were offered partial amnesty. Despite
Nicaragua’s willingness to negotiate, Reagan believed the best alternative was to
continue his course of action. He wrote in his diary in the same month that “it’s amazing
how much consensus there is…that what we are doing is right & Nicaragua is the real

29

Burns, 6-7.
The Somoza family had been in control of the Nicaraguan government since 1936.
31
Gary Prevost, The FSLN, in Nicaragua Without Illusions: Regime Transition and Structural
Adjustment in the 1990s, ed. Thomas W. Walker (Wilmington, De: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1997), 153.
32
Prevost, 153.
30
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villain.” 33 Whereas the Sandinistas showed the willingness to cooperate and negotiate,
Reagan believed in his original plans to overthrow the government through the Contra
forces. He clearly was getting similar advice from the Administration to continue as
planned in Nicaragua. Although Secretary of State George Shultz initially accepted the
Sandinista initiatives, the Administration later dismissed Nicaragua’s moves as a
“campaign of deception designed to avoid real accommodation.” 34
Because Congress refused to appropriate as much money as desired by Reagan, the
Administration turned to clandestine means such as acquiring funds from Saudi princes
and various illegal and unconstitutional practices. 35 One of Reagan’s tactics named
Operation Elephant Herd utilized the CIA and the Pentagon. Authorized by the President
in June of 1982 and then implemented in December of the same year, the operation
channeled military equipment secretly from the Pentagon’s inventory to the CIA for the
Contras’ use. For example, in 1983 when Congress announced a legal cap of $24 million
in aid to the Contras, Elephant Herd provided an additional $12 million worth of military
supplies. 36 Investigation exposed the CIA for its deplorable action in Nicaragua, such as
the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the preparation of an “assassination manual”, the
military buildup in Honduras, and numerous other incidents, all which tarnished the
American position in Nicaragua. 37
One of Reagan’s principal arguments against the Sandinistas was that they were not a
legitimate government because their elections in 1984 were “rigged.” The people of
33

Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 189.
Roberts, 78-9.
35
Ibid., 70. Reagan wrote in his diary in December of 1981: “We’re proceeding with covert
activity in Nicaragua to shut off supplies to the guerillas in El Salvador.” (Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 52.)
36
Leslie Cockburn, Out of Control: The Story of the Reagan Administration’s Secret War in
Nicaragua (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987), 12.
37
Jentleson, 70.
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Nicaragua, according to Reagan, were being oppressed and viewed the government
unfavorably. The Contras, to Reagan, represented freedom for Nicaraguans. He went as
far as saying that the Contras were “the moral equal of our Founding Fathers.” 38
A primary reason President Ortega of Nicaragua wanted to hold elections was to
meet his commitment to the people. He promised that as soon as “the conditions for
national reconstruction might permit [elections]” the FSLN would create and
institutionalize an authentic democracy in the framework of political pluralism and a
mixed economy. 39 Ortega and his government were following through on a promise to
the citizens of Nicaragua.
A delegation of fifteen professors from the Latin American Studies Association and a
U.S. organization of over three thousand U.S. academic specialists on Latin America
were observers during the 1984 elections. They reported favorably upon the November
elections, concluding that they “observed no evidence of irregularities in the voting or
vote-counting process.” 40 The FSLN won 67 percent of the vote, and the Reagan label of
the election as a “Soviet-style sham” turned out to be false. 41
World reaction to the U.S. trade embargo, beginning in May of 1985, was uniformly
negative. U.S. allies including the United Kingdom, Germany, Spain, and Portugal, all
openly opposed the embargo and promised continued trading relationships with
Nicaragua. Countries such as Canada, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden
extended new trade credits to help offset the effects of the embargo. 42 Nicaragua largely
succeeded in winning the moral “high ground” in the international community.
38

Pach, 84.
Robinson, 30.
40
Burns, 36-37.
41
Robinson, 30-32.
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Leogrande, 339.
39

14

Washington found itself isolated as its policies were being increasingly condemned. The
“Nicaraguan issue” became a headache for U.S. representatives wherever they turned in
the world. 43 The signing of the Arias Treaty in 1987 by Honduras and El Salvador, the
closest Central American allies to the U.S., left the U.S. virtually alone in its support for
the Contra war. 44 Even public support for Reagan’s policy was low. An opinion poll
showed that only 27.3 percent of Americans agreed with Contra aid. 45 Reagan’s behavior
toward Nicaragua, particularly in the glaring disregard for international law and world
opinion, threatened to backfire and endanger broader U.S. interests, especially with
foreign allies. 46 At the United Nations in 1985, the Security Council voted 11-1 (with 3
abstentions) for a resolution condemning the U.S. embargo. The U.S., however, used its
veto. In General Assembly, a similar resolution was passed 84-4 (with 37 abstentions). 47
Directed by Oliver North, the Administration secretly sold arms to Iran to obtain
additional funding for the Contras. The U.S. had a trade embargo with Iran at the time,
but Iran needed weapons for its war with Iraq. From August of 1985 until October of
1986, the National Security Council secretly made six shipments of arms to Iran.48 These
sales of arms also became a bargaining opportunity for the release of American hostages
in Lebanon. Reagan was not only within range of impeachment for the secret sale of U.S.
weapons to Iran in exchange for hostages, which violated not only the Arms Export
Control Act and the National Security Act, but also violated his own stated policy against
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dealing with terrorists. 49 North’s illegal use of proceeds to finance the rebels in Nicaragua
had violated Congress’s constitutional authority over government appropriations, which
were explicit in the Boland Amendments. 50 Nevertheless, Congress decided not to
subject the American people to impeachment proceedings.
Following the Iran-Contra Affair, Reagan’s influence over Nicaraguan policy
gradually eroded, and the Democratic Congress supplanted him as the primary policymaker for Nicaragua, determining policy through the legislative process and control of
the treasury. 51 The loss of GOP majority in the 100th Congress in 1986 helped accelerate
Reagan’s decline in influence over policymaking. After 1986, the pro-Contra coalition in
Congress was reduced, which allowed opponents in Washington to narrowly defeat
Reagan’s requests for additional military assistance afterwards.52 He lamented in his
personal diary of his struggles with Congress: “They support our Nicaragua peace
proposals but won’t go for Contra aid which is only way to get Sandinistas to talk
peace.” 53
When Reagan’s congressional aid requests for the Contras are analyzed, it shows that
Washington never fully supported his cause in Nicaragua, even when aid was granted.
Only once, in 1985, was the Administration granted the full amount requested for aid.
The President never got more than he had asked for, and in 1984 and 1988, Congress
almost cut off all Contra aid. 54 Even when Arias’ peace proposals stalled in the summer
and fall of 1988, Reagan took the opportunity to ask for aid, but his requests fell on deaf
49

Lawrence E. Walsh, Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up (New York: W.W.
Norton & Company, Inc., 1997), 3.
50
Walsh, 13. The Boland Amendments were passed in 1982 and modified in 1984.
51
Scott, 258.
52
Philip Brenner, and William M. Leogrande, “The House Divided: Ideological Polarization over
Aid to the Nicaraguan ‘Contras’,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 18, no. 1 (February 1993): 122.
53
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54
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ears. A majority of the U.S. government was by then committed to the peace process
with, or without Reagan’s support.55
Possibly even more influential than the loss of GOP control in Washington in
1986 were the successful diplomatic peace talks taking place outside of the U.S. The
Administration itself judged that the success of the diplomatic process had significantly
weakened the pro-Contra aid coalition, so Reagan therefore delayed request for additional
military aid until 1988, his final full year in office. 56
The Iran-Contra Affair and the revelations of the CIA hurt not only Reagan’s
reputation and legacy, but it essentially ended the chances for him to convince Congress
to support his Nicaragua policy. While Reagan was waging his war with the Sandinistas,
he ignored important facts: the FSLN was willing to compromise and make concessions
to the U.S. Furthermore, the FSLN was not oppressing its people. In fact, according to the
Defense Department, as stated in a leaked NSC strategy paper: “Support for democratic
resistance within Nicaragua [did] not exist” and they had known this fact as early as
1983. 57 The government enjoyed support of the people and held a legitimate election in
1984. Nicaragua was not a communist client state of the USSR, and had no desire to be.
Despite continued chronic guerrilla insurgency, the Contras achieved little military
success, and were thus failing Reagan and his vision. The Sandinistas definitely had their
vulnerabilities, but the Contras, CIA, and Reagan were not adept at targeting them. 58 By
1987-88, the possibility of a military solution to the war appeared increasingly unlikely,
and the Nicaraguan government inflicted numerous military defeats on the Contra Army,
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forcing the bulk of rebel forces back to Honduras, where the Contras were largely based.
Despite a brief rebel comeback, regional governments did not consider them to be a
viable instrument for the disintegration of the Sandinista regime. In fact, the Contras
never succeeded in capturing significant territory or population centers, nor were they
successful in igniting any urban insurrectionary movements. Furthermore, military
capability was hindered and undermined by internal political disarray within Contra
leadership and the inconsistency of U.S. congressional support. 59 A major step towards
democracy in Nicaragua only occurred after Congress halted the flow and transfer of
arms completely to the “freedom fighters” in 1988. 60 The disintegration of congressional
monetary aid was a failure of Reagan’s design for continuing the fight in the country.
The Contras were simply an unreliable and ineffective military force. 61
Due to his steadfast “bullying strategy” diplomacy and inept foreign policies
toward the Sandinistas, Reagan ended up mishandling the situation altogether in
Nicaragua. 62 The Contra military campaign against the socialist army was unsuccessful.
The citizens of Nicaragua still preferred their government under Sandinista leadership.
The government held legitimate elections in 1984 and Ortega was steadfast in assuring
that Nicaragua would not become a Soviet client state. Reagan achieved nominal support
outside the White House with his policies once the GOP lost control of Congress, and
over time, his power and influence declined as the effects of the war and the exposure of
the Iran-Contra Affair came to light.
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As we have seen, Reagan Doctrine saw limited success in several arenas, and
downright failure in others. But despite the Reagan Doctrine’s failures and miscues,
Reagan and the Administration held on to the economic war, which was the only hope for
success. Constant economic pressure throughout the 1980s proved to be very effective.
Reagan’s most valuable weapon against the Sandinistas was attacking the government
economically through sanctions and embargo, pressuring banking institutions against
working with Nicaragua, and using the Contras to attack the economic infrastructure of
the country.
Although Reagan did not publicly authorize the attacks against non-military
targets, it is apparent that the CIA orchestrated and participated in operations against
domestic targets. Reagan wanted to delegitimize the government by defeating it
militarily, but his campaign was ineffective. In fact, in mid-1985 it became clear to the
State Department that the Contras would be incapable of overthrowing the government. 63
By the time he left office, economic sanctions were Reagan’s only effective foreign
policy tool with Nicaragua. It was essentially the nation’s failing economy that pushed
Ortega and the socialists out of power.
Reagan was much more assertive and aggressive with Nicaragua than his
predecessor President Jimmy Carter, who initially accepted the Sandinista transition to
power. Carter wanted to maintain a good relationship with the country. He was also less
concerned with the USSR’s involvement or role in Sandinista Nicaragua. Carter
perceived the Soviets as principled opportunists rather than the essential source of
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instability in the Third World. 64 He adopted a policy of “cautious acceptance” of the
Sandinistas and granted foreign aid up to $75 million to the country during the fiscal year
of 1980. 65 However, when he discovered the Sandinista government was using some of
its allocated funds to support El Salvadoran rebels (which was later one of Reagan’s
rationales for intervening in Nicaragua), Carter immediately suspended aid. As he left
office, an already tense relationship with the country opened the door for Ronald Reagan
to consider further and more assertive action. In fact, the “Reaganites’” electoral platform
deplored the “Marxist Sandinista takeover Nicaragua,” and announced opposition to
Carter’s aid program for the FSLN, or “assistance to any Marxist government in this
hemisphere.” 66
Following his inauguration, Reagan decided to withhold aid and halted shipments
of wheat to Nicaragua. 67 Loans that Carter had suspended, Reagan officially
terminated.68 This was not a surprise. In a radio address in March of 1979 before
becoming president, Reagan believed the Nicaraguan rebels, who were trying to
overthrow the Somoza Regime, were involved with communist nations. 69 In his first
speech on the economy as President, just sixteen days into his term, Reagan spoke of his
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concerns in Nicaragua, saying that there was “Soviet-inspired trouble in the
Caribbean…and leftist regimes have already taken over in Nicaragua.” 70
For a short period of time, Reagan continued minimal financial support to the
Sandinistas, hoping diplomatic pressure and threats to cut off economic assistance would
succeed. Even though Sandinista shipments to El Salvador stopped, Reagan eventually
decided to cut off Nicaraguan aid permanently. Within weeks, however, the USSR began
to provide wheat and economic assistance to Nicaragua, and additional countries,
including Cuba, joined to help aid the country. Fidel Castro’s government provided $64
million in technical aid in 1981. 71 If Reagan’s “hard line” policy toward Nicaragua had
not been taken, it is possible that socialist countries such as the USSR and Cuba would
not have gotten financially involved in Nicaragua. Because of his aggression, Reagan
forced the USSR and Cuba to supply considerable aid to Nicaragua.
There was no concrete evidence connecting Nicaragua with communist nations
that extended past economic relationships and military monetary aide. Reagan and his
hardliners were impatient in their actions towards the Sandinistas, and though it appeared
tough diplomacy and the threat of aid was originally successful, it did not coincide with
Reagan’s vision of a “free” Nicaragua. A free Nicaragua could only become a reality, in
Reagan’s mind, if the Sandinistas were ousted. However, it may have been Reagan’s plan
to push the USSR and Cuba into draining resources into Nicaragua. The weaker those
nations became, the more likely those communist nations would eventually fall, as the
USSR certainly did at the end of the decade.
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Beginning in 1981, the U.S. was moving towards a trade embargo against
Nicaragua. In 1980, Nicaraguan conducted 30.4 percent of its trade with the U.S. but by
1984, trade between the two nations had shrunk to 14.9 percent.72 By May 1985 a full
embargo was in effect. It was internationally condemned by nations and its leaders who
voted and called for the halting of the embargo. The U.S., however, utilized its veto
powers and ignored outside protests, even from their staunchest of allies. The embargo
was not lifted until the Sandinistas fell in 1990 when George H.W. Bush was President.
The financial aggression towards Nicaragua was substantial. Not only did the
United States ruin the Nicaraguan economy through financing a rebellion within the
country, but it also effectively constricted the country by controlling and manipulating
national and foreign banking institutions from providing assistance. Due to U.S. pressure
on multilateral institutions (World Bank, IMF, IDB etc.) and private banks, Nicaragua
had no access to “soft” loans (low interest rates and long repayment periods) to invest in
infrastructure. 73 Washington did whatever it could to keep money from flowing into
Nicaragua. For example, the U.S. vetoed a $2.2 million IDB loan to finish a rural road
project that had begun in 1976 and was over 90 percent completed. This angered many
representatives from other countries. 74 Secretary of State George P. Schulz warned the
American Development Bank in 1985 that accepting a Nicaraguan agricultural credit loan
request for $58 million risked the loss of U.S. financial support.75
Officials and Republican congressmen threatened banks from whom Nicaragua
requested loans and they exercised veto power within the World Bank and Inter-
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American Development Bank against aid to the country. They filibustered in discussions
of Nicaraguan policy, and bullied, threatened, and intimidated those who supported the
country. By 1984, Nicaragua stopped repaying foreign debt to the U.S. because it was
getting nothing in return in terms of new funds. 76 International assistance was on steep
decline, and the economy suffered tremendously. The U.S. government continued to
pressure Western European nations to reduce foreign aid in Nicaragua, and to establish
political conditions for any assistance. 77 International economic support was almost
exclusively burdened by the USSR and Cuba. Soviet aid to Nicaragua was at its zenith in
1987, spending between $750-800 million annually: $300 million in economic aid, and
between $450-500 in military aid. Economic aid was especially important because it
included almost all of Nicaragua’s petroleum imports. 78 The efforts to isolate Nicaragua
from international economic intercourse essentially drove the Sandinistas into
dependence on Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern European aid for economic survival. 79
The Nicaraguan government instituted a “rear-guard” economy, meaning that
money budgeted by the government went almost exclusively to the military instead of
education, healthcare, and other essential social services. 80 The cost of the war was
shouldered by the urban sector because the countryside was ravaged by the Contras, and
the agrarian economy was all but halted by the rebellion. Farmers displaced by Contra
attacks fled to the cities. The U.S.-financed war resulted in the collapse of the forestry,
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fishing, and mining sectors and decimated agrarian industries, especially the coffee
industry. 81
U.S. Special Forces corroborate that the focus of Contra attacks was principally
economic targets such as oil fields and local farms. CIA director William Casey wanted
to “make the bastards sweat.”82 The goal of the CIA and Contra forces was to attack vital
economic installations, the mission being to “sabotage ports, refineries, boats and
bridges…and especially difficult sabotage operations were carried out by U.S. Navy
Seals.” 83 The U.S. played an important part in these sabotage campaigns, but made every
effort to cover its tracks by pinning these actions on the Contras, keeping connections
with the U.S. out of the conversation as much as possible. 84 The CIA supposedly does not
act on its own. It takes orders from the executive branch of government and does not
make policy autonomously. Did Reagan know what the CIA was doing? Possibly.
However there is no concrete proof that he did.
The mining of port cities outraged world opinion, and further condemnation of the
Reagan activities in Nicaragua ensued. In fact, it angered U.S. policy makers as well. For
example, Republican Senator, Barry Goldwater, typically supportive of Reagan, was
quoted saying on March 5, 1985: “This is no way to run a railroad. I am pissed off!” 85
Reagan was frustrated with the revelation of the harbor mining as well as Goldwater’s
public outcry. Reagan wrote in his diary: “He [Goldwater] is raising hell…because of the
harbor mining… [He] says he was never briefed. He was briefed on March 8 & 13. There
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is a rebellion which will lead to their shutting aid off to the Nicaraguan Contras.” 86
Oftentimes Contra leadership had no role to play in these actions. Contra leader Edgar
Chamorro said this: “Of course, we played no role in the mining of the harbors. This was
not unusual. The CIA often gave us credit (or perhaps blame) for operations that we knew
nothing about.”87
The Contra forces were successful in one thing: they damaged the economy and
standard of living in Nicaragua by attacking the social and economic infrastructure of the
country. The Contras continued their fight against domestic targets. For example, in 1985
alone, 55 health centers, three children’s nutritional centers, two electrical plants, and 44
schools (not including 502 that were damaged) were destroyed.
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By the beginning of

1986, war casualties on both sides amounted 31,290 and there were 120,324 people
displaced. From 1980 to 1987, Nicaragua claimed nearly $1.5 billion in war-induced
damages to infrastructure and production. 89 An entire generation of Nicaraguan youth
was damaged beyond repair because their education was halted and men were drafted to
fight. War led to the scarcity of labor, a decline in production, the breakdown of local
trade, a decline of 50 percent in real wages, and a huge urban migration from the
countryside to the major industrial cities. 90
In 1987 inflation exceeded 1,000 percent and per capita foreign debt was the
highest in Latin America: growing to $7 billion from $1.5 billion when the FSLN took
power. 91 The Nicaraguan government claimed that unemployment by 1988 had surged

86

Reagan, “Reagan Diaries,” 231.
Burns, 56.
88
Ibid., 62.
89
Roberts, 92.
90
Fitzgerald, 206.
91
Linda Robinson, “Peace in Central America?,” Foreign Affairs 66, no. 3 (January 1988): 599.
87

25

over 25 percent and from 1980 through 1987, there had been nearly $1.15 billion in warinduced damages to infrastructure and production in Nicaragua. 92 By 1988, Nicaragua
was in a severe recession and the economy contracted by 15 percent and inflation was on
the steady increase. 93 In fact, that year hyper-inflation of 33,000 percent had set in. This
forced the government to curtail its revolutionary social programs and adopt a series of
severe austerity measures to address the fiscal and balance-of-payments crises. 94
The blocking of bilateral and multilateral assistance was constructed by the U.S.
government in the attempt to provoke domestic dissent and an eventual overthrow of the
Sandinista regime. The Administration hoped to coerce the people of Nicaragua to call
for a change in government leadership, understanding that continued U.S. pressure would
weaken the Nicaraguan economy and the standard of living of its citizens. U.S. officials
and the President, according to a British Foreign Office official, used “typical of bullyboy tactics which the present U.S. Administration is apt to adopt –towards allies as well
as adversaries” with there actions in Nicaragua, especially with economic sanctions. 95
U.S. pressure and sanctions strapped Nicaragua, and it was nearly impossible for
the country to develop a sustainable economy. President Reagan may have failed to
overthrow the government through a military means, but his “freedom fighter” Contras
successfully facilitated an economic collapse of Nicaragua. 96 The combination of Contra
attacks on domestic targets and the U.S.-based sanctions and embargo were too much for
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the people of Nicaragua to handle. A majority of scholarly opinion holds that economic
sanctions are an ineffective foreign policy tool. Unlike other attempts of the U.S. to
destabilize governments around the world, however, economic sanctions in Latin
America have been more successful. 97 A primary case in point is that of Nicaragua.
Nicaragua was not the only focus of Reagan Doctrine in the world. Similar
policies formed the Administration’s global strategy. While the Administration had its
hands tied in Nicaragua, it sponsored and participated in similar actions in Afghanistan,
Libya, and Lebanon among other nations. 98 Reagan was supporting insurgencies all over
the globe to harass the USSR, forcing the communists to spend millions and millions of
dollars in economic aid to socialist allies. For example, by the mid 1980s, annual
appropriations for covert support of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in its war against the
Soviets reached $650 million. The costs incurred by the USSR contributed to their
eventual defeat. The Administration moderately supported the UNITA (National Union
for the Total Liberation of Angola) rebels who were fighting the Cubans and Angolan
government troops in Angola, and provided aid to the non-communist resistance against
the Soviet-influenced People’s Republic of Kampuchea in Cambodia. 99 Historians agree
that Reagan found the most success in Afghanistan, as the Mujahedeen were eventually
successful in pushing the USSR out of the country. Their long, bitter war devastated and
drained Soviet resources.
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When Reagan left office after his second term as President in January of 1989, the
Sandinistas and President Ortega were still in power. A majority of Contra guerrilla
forces had retreated back to Honduran base camps, and the Sandinistas were on the
diplomatic offensive to “achieve a regional accord for their definitive demobilization.” 100
In February 25, 1990, when Ortega was defeated in the elections, President George H.W.
Bush would be the Commander-in-Chief. However, it was not Reagan or Bush who
ultimately negotiated peace between Nicaragua and the Contras or orchestrated the
victory of Violeta Chamorro. The peace initiative sponsored by Costa Rican President
Oscar Arias led to a ceasefire in 1988. 101 It was primarily the efforts of Arias and the
Democrats in Congress who mediated the political transition and organization of free
elections. 102 Reagan had the opportunity to join Arias in support for the peace plan, but
rejected the offer. He wrote in his diary a year before the peace accords in June of 1987,
saying: “[Arias] has a peace proposal he wants to make on behalf of his Central
American neighbors & to us to the Sandinistas. We’re in favor of his idea…but his plan
has some loop holes the Sandinistas could take advantage of.” 103 Reagan was clearly
frustrated that he was no longer involved in the peace process. Plans that he had were
scrapped and he was accused of impeding the process of peace. In his diary he wrote in
response: “Speaker Wright has deserted his & our agreement on how to make peace in
Nicaragua & charges us with being guilty of breaking up the peace efforts. Lies. Lies.
Lies.” 104
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Reagan Doctrine foreign policy in Nicaragua was complex and measuring its
success or lack thereof is difficult to do. It failed in many ways: military action was
unsuccessful and diplomatic pressure by the Administration and the lack of positive
world opinion did not help Reagan and his policies. Economic sanctions, the trade
embargo, and Contra attacks on domestic targets, did, however, lead to eventual
government change in Nicaragua. Also, at the same time, military action and economic
constraints caused the USSR and Cuba to squander precious resources on Nicaragua,
which may have been Reagan’s plan all along.
The Contra war was problematic from the beginning. They rarely saw success on
the battlefield, and the people of Nicaragua rejected the campaign and battle cries against
the government. Partially due to the financial support of the Soviet Union, the FSLN and
the national military were never legitimately threatened by the rebel forces. The loss of
life due to this useless war was tragic. More than 30,000 Nicaraguans, comprised of
combatants and citizens, were killed needlessly. In addition, by 1988 there were well over
100,000 refugees. These statistics alone justify condemning the Reagan Doctrine as
disastrous and devastating to Nicaraguans. Reagan failed to get any significant domestic
or international support for his actions in Nicaragua and was criticized and condemned in
the international political arena. The Administration argued that Nicaragua was working
closely with Cuba and the USSR, and that the presence of a communist nation on the
North American continent was a grave danger to the national security of the U.S.105 The
FSLN instead desired nothing more than to improve the conditions in their country. There
105
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is no evidence that Ortega desired to conspire against the U.S. Reagan, therefore, had no
need to spend time supporting and facilitating the rebellion effort in Nicaragua. The
USSR and Cuba began to aid Nicaragua only after Reagan had began to choke out the
economy, leaving Ortega no choice but to look elsewhere for help.
The unrelenting U.S. destabilization campaign and devastating economic
sanctions and embargo imposed by Reagan embittered most of the Nicaraguan population
against the Sandinistas. They were not unhappy with the government itself, but with how
the government had mismanaged the economy. Also, the declined standard of living
occurred because fending off the Contras was consuming 60 percent of the national
budget. Due to the U.S. economic stranglehold, the people were looking for a change. 106
The FSLN was forced to choose between implementing a form of wartime communism
or negotiating a way out. Believing they could win the elections, finally defeat the
Contras, and stabilize the economy, they chose to allow elections. 107 International
observers saw the Sandinistas defeated in one of the most closely scrutinized elections in
world history. 108 The people of Nicaragua decided that they had had enough of the
Sandinistas in power, and were unwilling to allow the government to keep fighting while
the country continued to suffer. The vote in 1990 was not pro-Contra, but it was prochange. 109
The case study of Reagan foreign policy in Nicaragua is complicated, perplexing,
and compelling. The superpower nation meddled in a Third World country the size of
North Carolina and was struggling to achieve its goals. Despite the U.S. being vastly
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superior, it took a decade to get the socialist government out of power. The events
sparked international attention to the U.S. exploitation and manipulation in Latin
America, and even inspired groups like U2 and their famous rock anthem, “Bullet the
Blue Sky” in the entertainment industry to bring attention to the issues. 110
The funding and support of the Contras was unsuccessful. The movers and
shakers who negotiated peace and organized free elections did not reside in the White
House. What facilitated the collapse of the FSLN? Essentially, it was the U.S. economic
sanctions and trade embargo. Reagan’s legacy in Latin and Central America is tarnished
at best. His foreign policy was disastrous. The Administration was exposed for corruption
with the revelations of the Iran-Contra Affair and the CIA involvement in terrorist-like
acts in Nicaragua. Reagan’s power and influence diminished rapidly as his second term
came to a conclusion. Like many historians have said, Reagan’s claim to credit for
Nicaraguan political change is at best “limited,” for it was weakened by the costs it
incurred and the opportunities foregone. 111
Nicaragua was but one piece to Reagan’s global foreign policy strategy. It is
important to note, that while the Reagan Administration was intervening in Nicaragua, it
also manipulated eventst elsewhere in the world. Nicaragua was not the only victim to
Reagan’s aggressive policies. Countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Angola
were infiltrated by U.S.-sponsored military insurgencies and suffered from U.S.
economic policies. Though it can be argued that Reagan’s intervention in the Third
World was essential in bringing down the USSR two years later, many people suffered
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the consequences of Reagan Doctrine. Nicaragua is an important case study of how
effective and ineffective Reagan’s policies were in the Third World.
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